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eptember 2008 can be considered as
the most dramatic period in recent financial
history, with shocking events witnessed and
recorded one after the other. US government-
sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, going into conservatorship. The
American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
appealing to the US Federal Reserve Bank for
a bailout. Wall Street stock prices plummet-
ing. Financial titans like Merrill Lynch and
Bear Stearns seeking cover from white
knights, Bank of America and JP Morgan
Chase, to avoid bankruptcy. Lehman Brothers
disappearing from the financial map. And the
US government committing approximately
$1.4 trillion so far to bail out the financial
sector (Table 1). Although there is greater
confidence now that the crisis had abated,
the economic condition would nonetheless
remain moribund, at least, until next year.
How do all these affect the Philippines? This
Policy Notes attempts to understand the
potential economic implications to the
Philippines of this US crisis and distill impor-
tant policy lessons especially for financial
regulation.
Channels of crisis impact
So far, the Philippines has not yet felt the
effect of the financial mayhem in the US in
any major way. To start with, the Philippine
banking system has minimal exposure to
structured financial products.1 But because
______________
1 News accounts of Philippine banks’ exposure to the
Lehman Brothers’ collapse put it at approximately 0.11
percent of total banking assets, or PhP5.5 billion.
Individual banks with market losses from the derivatives





the United States is a large economy with
major effects on the global economy, the
Philippines will eventually also feel the pinch.
There are several channels through which this
can take place.
One is through the potential decrease in
investment. The US is the major source of
investments in the Philippines. In 2007, it
accounted for 33 percent of new foreign
direct investment (FDI). With capital being
scarce and Main Street suffering the cold wind
from Wall Street, potential new investments
or expansion plans of foreign subsidiaries
might temporarily be shelved. Among the
major US investments are those in the busi-
ness process outsourcing (BPO) industry. With
an increase in US unemployment
and the potential decrease in
average wages, US corporations
might give aggressive investment
expansion of offshore
outsourcing  a rethink, if only
out of political sensitivity or
concern for potential backlash on
what is perceived as employment
export.
Another channel is through
decrease in remittances. With the
US recession bringing down the
global economy, jobs of overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) may also
be at risk. Already, the New York
Times reported that many rich
people in New York have terminated nanny
jobs. Today, it may be nanny jobs; tomorrow,
it might be other types of jobs in which
Filipinos are usually employed. Thankfully, the
demand for nurses has not yet declined in the
US and elsewhere; but with a weakening
economy, many other professions will experi-
ence poor demand.
A third channel is through decrease in tourism
receipts. With a recession looming, many  will
likely shelve vacation plans to distant places
and will instead substitute going to nearby
destinations to save money. This means that
less US and European tourists might be
expected to visit Asia. Unless this gap is
filled up by increased domestic tourism or
other tourists from Asia, tourism services
Table 1. Summary of current financial intervention
Beneficiary Action Financial Commitment
Bear Stearns (March 14, 2008) Credit line for asset purchase $28.8 billion
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(September 7, 2008) Senior preferred stock purchase Initial commitment:
  $100 billion each; no set limit
Purchase of mortgage-backed No set limit
  securities
Credit facility No set limit
AIG (September 16, 2008) Purchase of preferred shares $40 billion
5-Year Loan $110 billion
Citigroup (December 2008) Purchase of bad assets and $247.5 billion
  preferred shares; credit
  guarantee
Troubled Asset Relief Program Purchase of bad assets
(TARP)   and company shares $700 billion
Source: Various news articlesPN 2008-10
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which comprised 58 percent of total services
exports in 2007, will take a dive in the short
term.
Finally, the most predictable channel is the
decline in exports as a result of weak demand
in the US and other parts of the world.
Lessons from the crisis
Notwithstanding  the potential downward
spiral which the US crisis can cause in the
economy, there are significant lessons to
learn from this crisis experience. Understand-
ing the cause of the crisis and the noteworthy
response of the authorities is thus important
to draw important policy lessons.
Poor loan quality
One of the major factors in the US mortgage
loan defaults that led to the 2008 financial
panic is the rapid increase in subprime loans.
Though the immediate crisis triggers came
from the securities market, the core of the
problem is the poor quality of loans from the
originators of the traded securities. These
mortgage originators were not only banks
(operating under tight regulation) but also
‘monoline’ financial institutions that do not
operate under a prudential regulatory frame-
work. Issuances of below-investment grade,
mortgage-backed securities ballooned be-
tween 2003 and 2006, from US$37.4 billion
to US$114.3 billion in the first semester of
2006.2 The increase in subprime loans has
been aided by a glut of investible funds in
the market and the prolonged low-interest
environment that has fueled high economic
growth. Under this environment, lax control
on loan quality ensued, with so-called ‘ninja’
loans given to those with ‘no income, no jobs,
no assets’ borrowers, and ‘low- or no-docs’
loans proliferated. Predatory lending was
likewise prevalent, taking advantage of the
lack of financial sophistication of subprime
borrowers, providing many enticements for
borrowers to refinance. Examples of these
enticements are offers of ‘teaser’ interest
rates or fresh loans with cash out, even as
the fine prints say that interest rates will
increase over the lifetime of the loan.
The relevant policy lesson here is the need for
continuous watchfulness of financial regula-
tors over the quality of loans in the financial
system. The Asian crisis had already helped
the Philippines establish many controls on
banks that should help in this regard. How-
ever, should there be existing nonbank
sources of loans in the domestic market that
are beyond the prudential regulatory net of
the Central Bank, this should warrant a closer
look from regulatory authorities. For as long
as they transact financial loans and/or
securities, the lesson from the crisis is that it
matters to know where such entities source
their funds and how much “own capital” they
have. Otherwise, the moral hazard incentive
to loan out money they do not own without
______________
2 Taken from Inside Mortgage Finance as cited by Randall
Dodd, “Subprime: tentacles of a crisis,” Finance and
Development Vol. 44, No. 4 (December 2007).PN 2008-10
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careful regard for quality can, as the US and
Asian financial crises have shown, lead to
future trouble.
‘Cutting clean’
Another lesson from the current crisis is that
sales of performing and nonperforming loans
(NPLs) to another entity should be done
‘cleanly’. Thankfully, the now expired Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Law had required ‘true
sale’ for NPLs that want to benefit from the
many tax and fee waivers. Yet, it is important
to understand whether there are, indeed, no
more trappings in those NPL transfers.
In the case of the US financial crisis, many
banks or loan originators agreed to a ‘put-
back’ option in the securitized loans, meaning
that the arranger (of the securities) may or
may not exercise the option to return the
transferred assets to the banks, and thus be
again reflected in banks’ balance sheets.
Other banks have also agreed to a contingent
financing for the arranger in the form of
credit lines to be able to fund the sale of the
securities. Thus, when the short-term com-
mercial credit market dried up as a result of
concern over huge number of defaulting
subprime loans, the ‘securitizers’ turned to
the banks for credit lines, drawing banks
again into the maelstrom of the subprime
loans problem, and leaving many of them
scrambling for additional capital to cover
their increased risks.
The irony is that while the sale of loans to
the arrangers or ‘special investment vehicles’
(SIVs) in the US should have preserved the
banks’ capital from further losses (in prin-
ciple, the loans sale should have removed the
risks from the banks’ balance sheets, making
them more strongly capitalized), it turned out
that there were other entrapments for banks
in the form of credit line commitments and
put-back option. This is not to mention that
the banks’ own holdings of subprime securi-
ties were backed by the same subprime loans
they sold to the SIVs.
Several policy lessons can be drawn from this.
The most important is with regard to the
treatment of asset-backed securities (ABS)3 in
the balance sheet of banks. The underlying
reason for banks’ purchase of ABS is that in
terms of capital provisions for potential
losses, these securities required far less
capital than mortgages. ABS, particularly
highly rated ones, contain much less risks
than loans and would thus require lower
capital requirement. Hence, buying ABS while
disposing old loans freed up some of the
banks’ capital to fund additional businesses,
e.g., more loans. The ‘originate-and-distrib-
ute’ model was a convenient way for banks to
spread the risk to more people who are willing
to hold on to the securities, leaving more of
their capital free to do business with.
One of the ways in which this model went
wrong is in the delegation of the regulatory
role to the assessor of risks, e.g., credit rating
______________
3 There are many forms of asset-backed securities.
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) is one form of ABS.PN 2008-10
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agencies (CRAs). In the ideal world in which
CRAs have no perverse incentives but to
objectively assess the risk levels of ABS, the
‘originate and distribute’ model would have
perhaps worked. But in the real world, the
CRAs derive their income from the arrangers
which seek their opinion. CRAs which give
more favorable ratings would naturally be
better sought than others that are more
conservative. In many cases, in order to
provide high rating, the CRAs themselves
advise the arrangers to put additional ‘en-
hancements’ to the securities in order to give
them a semblance of safety. Thus, securities
backed by subprime loans can be rated triple
A if they are imbedded with some credit
default insurance and the like. This perverse
incentive led to rating inflation, defrauding
investors of the actual quality of the assets
backing the securities. In turn, the triple A
rating made it possible for erstwhile highly
regulated financial institutions like insurance
and pension funds to purchase subprime
securities, something they would not have
been allowed to under their respective
mandates.
Thus, it is advisable that first, banks be
transparent about the actual nature of loans
and asset transfer to an SPV or SIV. Particu-
larly for loans that have benefited from
government tax and fees waiver, it is ideal
that there be no more ‘trappings’ connected
with the sold loans/assets in the form of
contingent financing or put-back options or
similar commitments. Even for those that do
not enjoy any special government financing,
these additional entrapments should at least
be made transparent for regulators to properly
assess the continued risk carried by the banks
with respect to those supposedly transferred
assets. A  thorough review would perhaps
recommend a needed capital boost higher
than what the bank books would show.
Second, regulators should do their own
assessment of securities risk, if possible. That
is, triple A securities should no longer enjoy
the same forbearance they once enjoyed
unless given by credit rating agencies that
regulators trust. Otherwise, even triple A ABS
should be required higher capital requirement
and loss provision than what they have
heretofore enjoyed.
Third, CRAs should build up their reputation
once again and be more transparent with
their ratings and downgrade criteria. Ideally,
they should provide an explanation and a
baseline mark, along with the final rating
that takes additional enhancements into
consideration. The idea is to provide more
information for investors in securities to
assess the risks they are taking on.
Are globalization and deregulation to
blame?
Some pundits have raised the question on
whether the US financial crisis came about as
a result of a borderless financial world and
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Law which
used to put boundaries on banks’ andPN 2008-10
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nonbanks’ cross-ownership and activities.
They noted that as a consequence of global-
ization, the free flow of funds to the US
contributed to the glut in funds that fueled
the lending boom and the consequent dete-
rioration in loan quality. Meanwhile, with
deregulation, banks’ activities multiplied far
beyond their core competencies of providing
loans. In fact, a huge portion of US banks’
income come not from interest earnings but
from fee-based activities, e.g., syndicated
loan arrangement, investment banking,
securitization, etc. The question is: might
deregulation inadvertently allowed banks to
venture into financial activities which, in
retrospect, should not have been prudently
permitted?
For sure, there will be many voices for and
against these questions. However, as regards
globalization, granted that globalization
helped fuel the lending boom, the solution to
the capital problems of banks when the crisis
erupted nonetheless laid with globalization as
well. What amazed many observers is how US
banks could remarkably raise more than
US$40 billion capital by September 2008
amidst the financial strains. Yet, raised
capital they did, because somewhere in other
parts of the globe, some investors remained
confident that the US is still a good place for
their investment and found good buys in the
US financial sector when equity share prices
plummeted. Of course, some eyebrows were
raised in the capital injection coming from
Sovereign Wealth Funds. But that is another
story (see Table 2).4
As for deregulation, the repeal of Glass-
Steagall Law, in fact, allowed the orderly
acquisition of Merrill Lynch and Bear Sterns
by Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase.
Without the new regulation based on the
Gramm-Leach-Biley Act, such acquisition











have thrown the US
______________
4 For more discussion on Sovereign Wealth Funds and their
role in the US financial crisis resolution, see Anna Paulson,
“Raising capital: the role of Sovereign Wealth Funds,”
Chicago Fed Letter No. 258.
Table 2. Sovereign wealth funds investment in US financial firms
Firm Sovereign Wealth Fund    Date of   Investment Equity Stake
Investment (in billion US$)  (in percent)
Citigroup (Round 1) Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 11/26/2007 7.5 4.9
Citigroup (Round 2) Government of Singapore Investment
Corp. and Kuwait Investment Authority 1/14/2008 7.9 5.2
Morgan Stanley China Investment Corporation 12/19/2007 5.0 9.9
Merrill Lynch (Round 1) Temasek Holdings (Singapore) 12/19/2007 5.0 9.9
Merrill Lynch (Round 2) Kuwait Investment Authority
and Korea Investment Corp. 1/15/2008 8.9 5.4
Source: Chicago Fed Letter, January 2009.PN 2008-10
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financial system at the edge of the precipice,
if not at the abyss.
The policy lesson for the Philippines is not to
easily blame globalization and deregulation.
Certainly, these two are no panacea, but to
make them scapegoats for troubles in the
financial sector is  barking on the wrong
trees. The lesson from the US financial crisis
is that adverse incentives of stakeholders in
the industry are to blame for the mayhem.
Another important lesson is the crucial role of
domestic laws that make possible the speedy
and orderly transfer of ownership in financial
institutions. Without this, huge government
resources have to be spent just to shore up
failing banks or pay for deposit liabilities.
Central Bank response
The Federal Reserve Bank’s response to the
crisis was three-pronged. It has lowered
interest rates in an exceptionally rapid and
proactive way since September 2007 to reduce
strains on credit conditions. It facilitated the
orderly ownership transfer or capital support
of systemically critical financial institutions
like Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, and
AIG. Lastly, when many traditional funding
sources for financial institutions have dried
up, the Federal Reserve provided liquidity
through the use of the discount window.
What is noteworthy in the Fed’s moves is its
aggressiveness and surgical targets. Through
the discount window, it infused liquidity
where it is needed while tethering inflation
expectation by not making more changes in
the federal funds rate. It allowed access to
nondepository institutions like investment
banks, primary government securities dealers,
and insurance companies to the discount
window which, until then, had been reserved
only for banks. It opened facilities to pur-
chase highly rated commercial papers and
provide backup liquidity for money market
mutual funds. By its targeting of temporarily
dysfunctional parts of the financial system
like the commercial paper market, the Fed
prevented further impairment of the financial
market.
The lesson for the Philippines is the need to
have the central monetary authority, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), possess
the capacity to act and act decisively. In the
Fed experience, the mandate to lend to
nondepositories under unusual and exigent
circumstances, provided they are backed by
sufficient collateral, armed them with the
necessary flexibility to act. And act they did.
Is the BSP endowed with the same scope for
flexibility in case of extraordinary financial
turmoil? This question should be important
enough to merit a reexamination of the BSP
mandate.
At the same time, the fiscal authority must
also have the wherewithal to back the moves
of the central bank. The Fed, on its own,
would not have moved as aggressively as it
did, were it not assured of being refunded byPN 2008-10
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the Treasury. The lesson here is the need to
maintain sound fiscal position in government
to acquire the necessary muscle to flex in an
adverse situation.
A peek at the future of financial
regulation
There is a positive and negative side to
having an underdeveloped capital market. The
negative side is, obviously, the limited
funding sources from the banking system.
Securitization, after all, provides the opportu-
nity for relatively cheap financing for invest-
ment and commercial expansion. The positive
side, on the other hand, is that we can look
at the experience of other more advanced
markets and avoid the pitfalls of excess.
On the regulatory side, considering the
converging businesses of banks and
nonbanks, there is a great need for a more
coordinated regulation and intervention. A
turf mentality would have resulted to greater
catastrophe in the US financial market. The
turf mentality which bedevils many govern-
ment agencies in the Philippines is something
that Philippine policymakers must truly reflect
upon and seek to prevent, both in normal and
adverse times.
Forbearance of banks’ use of securities for
regulatory arbitrage should now receive
greater scrutiny. Not only would credit ratings
for those securities be stricter and more
transparent but capital provisions for securi-
ties risk might need to be reexamined to see
if the current requirement  is sufficient.
In advanced markets, over-the-counter trade
of derivative securities had fallen short in
providing market liquidity during crisis
situations. It is likely that the existing
bilateral counterparty agreements will change
into a more central counterparties scheme
akin to that in the equity markets. In this
way, counterparty risks, which proved the
downfall of critical financial securities, are
mitigated.
Crises are good opportunities for critical
policies to be made that would be useful in
the future. As more minds look into the
unprecedented financial maelstrom in the US,
one becomes more optimistic that good ideas
are to be implemented for the greater stabil-
ity of securities market in the future. 